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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
American Law Institute has recommended legislation adopting, in
essence, the objective, police conduct approach. 4
Finally, there is little chance that a constitutional foundation
for entrapment will be accepted. The Supreme Court refused to
consider a due process challenge in the most extreme of contraband
cases, and even Justices Powell and Blackmun were not especially
encouraging in other areas. Essentially, the Court has once again
sanctioned an all-out war by police against hypothetically
"predisposed" individuals.
DOUGLAS KRAMER
The Freedom of Information Act: 1974 Amended
Time Provisions Interpreted
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit has interpreted the 1974 amended time provisions
of The Freedom of Information Act to mean that under excep-
tional circumstances, where an agency diligently processes re-
quests for information but physically cannot comply with the
restricted time limits, a court may grant the agency additional
time. The author suggests that the court's holding avoids a politi-
cal question that a less narrow holding would embrace. If the
amendments are to retain their force, Congress may need to clar-
ify the emphasis it intends for agencies to place on the screening
of requests as opposed to the performance of their normal regula-
tory duties.
Open America, a corporation, was organized to undertake pro.
jects in the public interest. One of these projects involved testing
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Code provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage
in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons
other than those who are ready to commit it.
(2) Except. . . [when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged] . . . a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he
proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to




the 1974 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) amendments allowing
an agency ten days (twenty days on appeal) to decide to release
requested documents and to notify the requesting party.'
On October 10, 1975, Open America requested that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation produce all documents and files on the role
of L. Patrick Gray (former Acting Director of the FBI) in the Water-
gate Affair. On November 5, 1975, twenty-six days later, a reply
from the Director of the FBI acknowledged the request and noted
that 5,137 FOIA requests had been received previously and 1,084
were being processed. On November 12, 1975, thirty-three days after
the initial request, Open America appealed to the Appeals Officer
of the Freedom of Information Unit of the FBI. This letter was
redirected to the proper appeals office within the Office of the Dep-
uty Attorney General. The appeals office acknowledged the letter by
notifying Open America of its priority number. On January 22, 1976,
Open America filed an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia to compel compliance with or denial of
the request, pursuant to subsections (a)(4)(B)2 and (a)(6)(C)3 of the
FOIA. The court found for the plaintiff and ordered the agency to
release to the plaintiffs within thirty days an itemization and index-
ing of documents and justification for documents claimed to be
exempted from disclosure under the FOIA.4 The government ap-
1. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 608 n.4, 609 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
The statute tested, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(1970), states:
Each agency, upon any request for records . . . shall -
(i) determine within ten [working] days . . . after the receipt of any such request
whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person
making such request of such determination . . .
(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty [working]
days . . after the receipt of such appeal.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975) states:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld . . . . [T]he court shall determine the matter de
novo, . . . and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Any person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph (1), (2),
or (3) of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the
applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph. If the Government can show
exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence
in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the
agency additional time to complete its review of the records.
4. 547 F.2d at 609.
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pealed, asserting exception to the limited time requirements by
authority of FOIA subsection (a)(6)(C) regarding exceptional cir-
cumstances. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held, vacated and remanded: Where an
agency is inundated with requests not anticipated by Congress, so
that existing resources are inadequate to meet the statutory time
limits, and where the agency can show due diligence in processing
those requests, then the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the
agency additional time to complete its review of the records. Open
America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
The author contends that this holding is based on a very nar-
row, and perhaps forced, construction of the FOIA amendment;
however, this construction may have been the only way for the court
to skirt a political question.' The political question would have in-
volved choosing which of two conflicting duties should be given
priority by the FBI: the screening of FOIA requests or the investiga-
tion and detection of federal crimes. Each of these alternatives, if
chosen, would then present a second constitutional problem.
Before detailing the two-tiered political question incipient in
the Open America litigation, it is helpful to examine the legislative,
executive and judicial actions which led to the 1974 FOIA amend-
5. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for a summary of controversies held non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine. The non-justiciability of a political question
is only a function of the separation of powers. "We have said that 'In determining whether a
question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system
of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the
lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.'" Id.
at 210, (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
However, in the case where "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion" has been made, and where "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving [a controversy]" exist, then
[dieciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Consti-
tution to another branch of government, or whether the action of the branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate




ments. These interactions reveal an ongoing policy struggle between
the congressional interest in public disclosure, the executive interest
in maintaining its executive privilege of secrecy and the judicial
interest in resolving these opposing forces without leaving the judi-
cial arena. These competing interests were ultimately at issue in
Open America, but they are temporarily in abeyance due to the
court's narrow statutory construction.
The FOIA has been acknowledged as an attempt to correct
deficiencies in former section 1002 of The Administrative Procedure
Act.' Although section 1002 detailed means of making records avail-
able and publishable for public information, the statute "came to
be looked upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosure
statute."' Some of the problems connected with section 1002 were:
(1) matters of record were to be made available only to "persons
properly and directly concerned;" ' (2) "any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest,"9 a broad and vague
classification, was exempted from disclosure; 0 (3) there was no pro-
vision made regarding sanctions for violations of the statute." The
FOIA, however, makes records open to the public, deleting the
"properly and directly concerned" test of access.'" Exemptions from
mandatory disclosure are spelled out in nine groups, 3 and district
courts are given the power to review exemption issues de novo. In
these reviews, the agency bears the burden of proving the eligibility
of withheld material for exemption. 4 Finally, violation of disclosure
6. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 1002) (repealed 1967); see Rose
v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
8. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (repealed 1967).
9. Id.
10. In discussing the problems with section 3 and the reasons for the new Act, the Court
in EPA v. Mink quoted a Senate Report: "The phrase 'public interest' .. , has been subject
to conflicting interpretations, often colored by personal prejudices and predilections. It ad-
mits of no clear delineations." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-82 (quoting S. REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965)).
11. Ch. 324, § 3, 6 Stat. 238 (1946) (repealed 1967).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975):
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably
described such records and (B),is made in accordance with published rules stating
the time and place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the
records promptly available to any person.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970 and Supp. V 1975). Roughly these exemptions are: 1)
executive secrets in the interest of national security; 2) internal workings of agencies; 3)
statutory exemptions; 4) privileged or confidential commercial or financial information; 5)
inter or intra-agency memorandums; 6) files which would invade personal privacy rights; 7)
investigatory records for law enforcement purposes; 8) files related to regulation of financial
institutions; and 9) geological data.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975); see note 2 supra for the text of this section.
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requirements is punishable by contempt.'5
The new disclosure act was quickly emasculated by EPA v.
Mink"' which tested the extent of the agencies' burden in proving
that requested records have been properly classified in one of the
exempted groups. In a suit to compel disclosure, members of Con-
gress argued that documents classified as Top Secret or Secret and
documents alleged to be inter or intra-agency memoranda involved
in executive branch decision making'7 should be inspected in
camera to sift out non-secret or purely factual material for disclo-
sure. This argument was based on the judicial authority to examine
the exemption de novo. The statutory de novo requirement allegedly
expressed the legislative intent to leave the ultimate decision of the
propriety of exemption to the courts.'" The Supreme Court rejected
that argument and accepted the EPA's contention that upon a
showing of the fact of classification as Secret or Top Secret by
Executive Order, the agency has sustained its burden of proving
eligibility for exemption.'" To require automatically an in camera
hearing as a requisite of sustaining the agency's burden of proof
would be "to subject the soundness of executive security classifica-
tions to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen."' "
The Court's conclusion has been summarized by one commentator
to mean that a procedurally correct executive classification of a
document as Secret will be sufficient to warrant the withholding of
a document and that classification will not be questioned by the
courts.2'
This interpretation of the scope of judicial review of exemption
claims and the shift toward a substantially lightened burden of
proof on the withholding agency prompted a flurry of congressional
activity aimed at revitalizing section 552. As one commentator re-
marked, "[T]he Court apparently misconstrued Congressional in-
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G) (Supp. V 1975). "In the event of noncompliance with the
order of the court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and
in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member."
16. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(G)(1),(5) (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
18. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion, said: "We have the word of both
Houses of Congress that the de novo proceeding requirement was enacted expressly 'in order
that the ultimate decision as to the propriety of the agency's action is made by the court and
prevent it from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.' " EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 100 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), (citing S.
REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965) and H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1966)).
19. Id. at 84.
20. Id.
21. Welch, Classified Information and The Courts, 31 FED. B.J. 360, 365 (1972).
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tent, for almost immediately after the Mink decision a flood of
proposed legislation to amend the Act began to appear."2 In Febru-
ary of 1973, House Resolution 4960, a forerunner of the amend-
ments, was introduced.
While the proposed amendments were clearing both houses,
President Ford expressed dissatisfaction with them. His concern
was that the amendments' limited time provisions would unduly
restrict the agencies in considering certain requests before making
the decision on whether or not to withhold. 3 In deference to the
President's concern, Congress immediately included two clauses,
(a)(6)(B) and (a)(6)(C) which had been in the Senate version. The
first allows a ten day extension for compliance when files are geo-
graphically separated or there are some other concrete obstacles to
complete indexing within the thirty days allowed. The second was
intended as an escape valve of indefinite duration when an agency
faces such exceptional circumstances that processing could not be
completed within the time limits despite the agency's due diligence
in processing the request. This escape valve would allow the court
to retain jurisdiction while allowing the agency additional time.24
Despite these clauses, President Ford vetoed the bill partially be-
cause of concern that the agencies would be so overburdened that
they could not perform their duties properly. 5 Congress overrode the
veto. This conflict between the executive and legislative branches
laid the basis for the extremely delicate political question which
ultimately was avoided by the court.
One of the most significant problems in any of the disclosure
acts is the ultimate constitutional problem of separation of power.
The central question is whether Congress can legislate disclosure so
as to defeat the executive power to keep secrets in the interest of
national security." Another question is whether judicial power ex-
tends to direct review of executive classification decisions.27 Courts
22. Lacher, The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 956 (1975) (footnote omitted).
23. See 547 F.2d at 610 n.ll.
24. It should be noted that only the first escape valve is available to the agency before
suit is filed. The second is available only when granted by a court.
25. See 547 F.2d at 610 n.il.
26. "The freedom of information act was not designed to open all government files
indiscriminately to public inspection . . . Obviously, documents involving such matters as
military plans and foreign negotiations are particularly the type of documents entitled to
confidentiality." Welch, supra n.21, (quoting Moss v. Laird, No. 1245-71 (D.D.C. Dec. 7,
1971)); see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 and n.9 (1953).
27. "The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the
claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
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are consistently reluctant to pass on such issues.2" As to the conflict
between Congress and the executive, the Court has gone so far as
to suggest that Congress, with stated justification, may set up clas-
sification procedures.29
As to judicial review of executive classifications, the provision
in the FOIA specifically authorizing in camera review of executive
classification has not yet been tested as to the ultimate judicial
power to reclassify according to the court's determination of the
needs of national security. Thus, judicial power has encroached on
executive power little more than has congressional power. One small
check on the executive secrecy prerogative occurs in exemption
cases where the preliminary showing fails to satisfy the courts that
some parts of withheld documents may not be severable and thus
subject to disclosure. In this context, in camera review has been
merely a sifting process, 0 and not an exercise of the reclassification
power.
The separation of powers conflicts have been avoided by the use
of statutory construction as a basis of decision by the courts, and
although the courts have gradually worked out an approximation of
the proper weight for each interest,3' the struggle between policies
is nonetheless vigorous. One might suggest that the resolutions used
by the Court have intensified the struggle by frustrating both
branches. Congress anticipated greater weight on the side of disclo-
sure; the executive branch desired less weight on disclosure. The
balance struck by the Supreme Court, though wavering from a
28. See id. at 6; "That there may be matter, the production of which the court would
not require, is certain . . . . What ought to be done, under such circumstances, presents a
delicate question, the discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered necessary in
this country." Aaron Burr Trial, I ROBERSON'S REPORTS 186 (Marshall, C.J.) cited in United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 n.18 (1953).
29. For example, in EPA v. Mink, the Court said: "Congress could certainly have pro-
vided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own
procedures-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to
impose upon such congressional ordering." 410 U.S. at 83.
30. It appears to us that Exemption 5 [inter or intra-agency memorandums]
contemplates that the public's access to internal memoranda will be governed by
the same flexible, commonsense approach that has long governed private parties'
discovery of such documents involved in litigation with government agencies.
And, as noted, that approach extended and continues to extend to the discovery
of purely factual material appearing in those documents in a form that is sever-
able without compromising the private remainder of the documents.
Id. at 91.
31. "In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of Information Act,
the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure, according to traditional
equity principles, and determine the best course to follow in the given circumstances. The
effect on the public is the primary consideration." GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th
Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 32:173
heavier emphasis for exemption of executive-classified secrets with
almost no in camera hearings, to a lighter emphasis on ordinary
executive privilege exemptions with occasional "necessary and ap-
propriate" 2 in camera hearings, does not settle the ultimate con-
flict.33
This conflict was bound to surface in connection with the FOIA
amended time limits. History indicates that time may be of the
essence to the public's right to know. 4 Yet, we have already seen
that the presidential concern was over the strict time requirements'
threat to the customary business of an agency.
The facts offered by the FBI in Open America show that the
time limits are considered unworkable if the agency is to screen
material satisfactorily before releasing it. Information requested
from the Justice Department goes through two readings: an initial
reading to determine the applicability of exemptions, then a review
of exemption claims to see whether "matter which is legally exempt
can still be disclosed without harm to, inter alia, confidential
sources, privacy of individuals, classified data, etc."35 Logically, this
higher review may also reveal that matters apparently subject to
disclosure may on review be determined legally exempt. Manpower
is a problem; already there are 191 employees at the FBI Headquar-
ters who are assigned to the processing of FOIA requests. When
Open America made its request, there was a total backlog of 5,137
requests.3"
Given the money and manpower shortage claimed by the FBI,
the expedition of Open America's request within the statutorily
prescribed time limit could come in one of only three ways: (1) a
reallocation of screening personnel according to the priority of judi-
cial enforcement decrees; (2) a reallocation of investigatory staff
32. Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
33. See the concurring and dissenting opinions of EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
34. "It is not sufficient to assume that if information is important it will get out. When
it gets out is crucial. ... Nader, New Opportunities for Open Government, 25 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 3 (1975).
35. 547 F.2d at 612.
36. Id. at 613.
[Riequests are separated into difficult and simple requests, identified respec-
tively as "project requests" or "non-project requests"....
A project request is assigned to a project team, headed by a supervisory
special agent, including five research analysts, and at least two research clerks.
The particular team to which Open America's request has been assigned is in
various stages of processing 33 other projects, all of which were received prior to
Open America's request. . ..
Id. at 612.
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generally to the screening process; or (3) a substantial curtailment
of pre-disclosure screening. The majority opinion deals well with its
refusal to reallocate by the first method, in that there was no ques-
tion of urgency which would justify according a judicially-imposed
preference over the 5,137 other requests." The second and third
choices are not analyzed.
When these latter alternatives are examined, the reasons com-
pelling settlement by statutory construction of the exceptional cir-
cumstances provision38 become clear. The court could be construing
that provision to mean that when refusal to grant relief to an agency
would entangle the court in problems of a political nature, the exis-
tence of those problems constitutes exceptional circumstances.
In order to visualize the functioning of the FOIA section 552,
let us first consider what the effect would be on a hypothetical
regulatory agency if that section were applied to it. Let us assume
that Congress by statute creates a quasi-legislative agency to regu-
late an interstate marketing of a particular class of consumer pro-
ducts. Assume further that Congress is prompted to do so by public
clamor over inconsistencies in quality which endanger consumers'
health, so that the statute creates the regulatory agency for the
express purpose of making rules and hearing complaints so as to
insure adherence to a given range of qualities in the goods. That
Congress has the power to delegate such functions has not been
seriously questioned since the "hot oil" and "sick chicken" cases.3"
All Congress need do is define its policy in creating the agency and
establish standards for achieving such a statutory purpose." The
agency then is free to pursue that goal, usually subject to judicial
review should any affected corporation or dissatisfied consumer al-
lege an abuse of discretion or action contrary to the statute or the
agency's own regulations. In its investigation of national variations
in quality, the agency may be empowered to keep records itself or
to require companies to keep records subject to administrative sub-
poena. "
As to this fictional agency, should Congress pass the section 552
amendments without the inclusion of the exceptional circumstances
37. Id. at 614.
38. See note 3 supra for the text of the exceptional circumstances provision.
39. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (sick chicken); Pan-
ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (hot oil).
40. See generally Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
41. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Burlington N., Inc., v. ICC, 462 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
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language, should a fictional plaintiff request such records as have
been kept, and should the agency have insufficient manpower to
continue amassing records and to screen so as to remove all matters
arguably exempt, then there is a question as to whether Congress
intended to give the information collecting provision or the disclo-
sure provision priority in the internal resource allocation of the
agency, or whether Congress intended to curtail substantially the
screening before disclosure. Given the power to create the agency,
Congress clearly has the power to modify the agency or to redirect
its energies. The only question is whether Congress had indicated
its intention clearly.
If the Congress in passing the amendments had mandated a
redirection of resources to expedite disclosure requests, either in the
statute or in the legislative history, then as one alternative the court
could order immediate compliance with the administrative dead-
line; the agency could be compelled to reallocate as Congress had
mandated, diverting manpower from routine supervision or data
collection to the screening process. As a second alternative, if Con-
gress had indicated an intention to subordinate the screening to the
ordinary business and had indicated in statute or legislative intent
that in such situations the agency was directed to waive the detailed
sort of screening that is geared to releasing technically exempt ma-
terial or to withholding arguably exempt material, then again the
court could order compliance and compel the agency to dispense
with the kind of processing the FBI has described in the instant
case.42 After minimum screening the agency would thus release all
materials including those arguably but not clearly exempt, and
would withhold only clearly and technically exempt materials.
In this hypothetical case, the court's task would be to ascertain
the intention of Congress as to the preferred effects of an order of
strict compliance in the face of a manpower shortage. If the court
could find that the basic preference had been stated so that the
court in its order of compliance and the agency in its compliance
could be guided in its responses to the requests, then strict compli-
ance could be ordered by the court. However, if the court could find
no preference stated, nor a decision made by Congress as to which
policy should be pursued in ordering the priorities of personnel and
screening options, then the court could not order compliance. To do
so would be to resolve a political question, that is, to make a policy
42. This kind of order is limited to a certain extent by some statutes and cases which
place.penalties on agencies which disclose material improperly. See Welch supra note 21 at
370.
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decision beyond the power of the court to make, since the power to
decide such policies has been committed to Congress.43
In Open America, the most conspicuous fact is that not only has
Congress not made a basic choice for a situation like the one the FBI
faced, but it never foresaw such potentiality of conflict in terms of
internal resources. In addition, even if the court were to find an
indication of policy choice, there would have to be no other constitu-
tional limitations on that choice before the court could compel the
agency to follow it. In Open America's case, the alternatives them-
selves may be subject to constitutional limitations.
The first alternative in the fictional example was to find a
congressional intention of reallocation from the ordinary agency
purpose to the disclosure process. Such a finding in Open America
would effect a frustration of the kind which concerned President
Ford. Though the power of Congress to spend is also the power not
to spend, it is questionable whether such an undercut could be
inferred in the absence of clear designation in actual appropriations
by Congress for that agency. For a court to effect a cutback in the
FBI function by ordering strict compliance would amount to a deci-
sion not within the discretion granted to the judiciary. This problem
was averted in the majority opinion by a finding that the financial
squeeze on the agency came as a result of gross underestimation of
requests rather than as a deliberate refusal of Congress to fund the
agencies' additional manpower needs.44
The second alternative in the hypothetical involved a waiver of
the right to withhold and litigate the question of arguably exempt
materials. Here, the congressional power to give up secrets runs intc
the wall of the executive privilege. In the hypothetical case, the
agency was a quasi-legislative body, regulating a consumer market
by delegated powers of Congress. In those imagined facts, it was not
43. This would be what one author describes as a jurisdictional problem, a problem of
lack of judicial power rooted in the Constitution. Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political
Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 7 (1968). It would not involve an exercise of what A.
Bickel calls a discretion not to decide a case, based on
the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the
strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the
sheer momentousness of it . . .; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally
. . the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no
earth to draw strength from.
Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1970) (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184
(1962)). Instead, the majority opinion reveals a court which is reaching through statutory
construction to avoid the application of the political question doctrine.
44. 547 F.2d at 612.
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assumed that the collection of information might ultimately involve
national security and the executive privilege. In the case of Open
America, the FBI is an executive agency, not a quasi-legislative
body. It is intimately involved in questions relating to national secu-
rity through its investigation of violations of federal laws. It is an
agency charged with an exclusively executive function and derives
its claim of privilege from the Presidency itself. 5 It is questionable
whether the Congress can, by financial pressure, coerce an executive
department into disclosure of sensitive materials by merely estab-
lishing a new set of priorities." Thus, to hold that the time limits
must be observed, in the face of the manpower shortage in screen-
ing, would be to accomplish either what the President feared in
regard to a thwarting of the investigatory role of the agency, or to
accomplish what the courts have refused to do, that is, to subordi-
nate the secrecy privilege of the President to the policy priorities of
Congress or the citizens."
The executive privilege problem was also skirted by the court
for lack of a clear statement in the statute or in the legislative
history to indicate congressional intent. Instead, the court found no
indication as to which alternative result Congress intended to effect.
It was thus faced with either making a choice for Congress clearly
beyond its judicial power," refusing to hear the case under the polit-
ical question doctrine, or construing the exceptional circumstances
language in the way the FBI contended was proper.
The exceptional circumstances clause was a tailored escape
from this judicial quandary. Even though some might feel the Open
45. Lacher, supra note 22 at 973; Welch, supra note 21 at 359-60.
46. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chicago & S. Air Lines v.
Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In all these cases, the Court refrained even from reviewing materi-
als claimed to be within the executive privilege to determine whether some portions were
disclosable because they were merely factual and separable.
47. The Court has gone only so far as insisting that the secrecy privilege does not protect
the material from in camera review for the purposes not of reclassifying, but of designating
separable, mere factual portions within the document. This review, furthermore, has been
upheld primarily in "matters of general domestic concern." Lacher, supra note 22 at 975. But
see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974) (pending criminal trial possibly
incriminating high level government officials).
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Tracking this language in Open America, we see
that under the spending power clause, the issue of funding and manning of the investigating
agency has been committed to Congress. There is a lack of discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the reallocation problems that could result from strict compliance.
There was no indication of Congressional awareness of the problems of compliance, much less
a choice as to alternative results, so that the Court could not order compliance without
making such a policy determination.
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America decision was not the best one, it should be remembered
that construction of that clause may have been the only way to keep
the action alive, and with the action, the amendments. A holding
generous to the agency may be preferable to dismissal due to the
nature of the action as involving a political question. This decision
does not, by any means, let the agency off the hook since the applic-
able clause allows the court to retain jurisdiction.
Read in light of the alternatives, the court's reasoning is much
more understandable. The same facts which support the doubt as
to whether Congress had in fact realized the effect of compliance,
and which make a holding of strict compliance so difficult for the
court, support the FBI's contention that it was operating under
exceptional circumstances. That Congress estimated the total addi-
tional cost of FOIA amendments to be $50,000 for 1974 supports
the inference that Congress did not intend either a reallocation of
personnel or a curtailment of the screening process. If this inference
is valid, then equally valid is the court's conclusion that "[i]f Con-
gress' anticipation of the burden thrust upon all agencies by its 1974
FOIA amendments is to be taken as a measuring stick, then surely
the demands placed on this one agency by Congress' action may
reasonably be viewed as 'exceptional circumstances.' "50 The court
makes clear that the allowance under the exceptional circumstances
clause is to be made only where "the agency will have found it
impossible to respond to a request within the time limits specified,
even with all due diligence . ... ,5 By reference to the Senate
Report on the amendments, the court further clarified that "[s]uch
'exceptional circumstances' will not be found where the agency had
not, during the period before administrative remedies had been ex-
hausted, committed all appropriate and available personnel to the
review and deliberation process.''52
The fact that 191 employees at the FBI headquarters process
FOIA requests, complicated by the "need to reapportion personnel
to comply with court orders in cases of genuine need, 5 3 and the fact
that both the project and nonproject requests were processed on a
first-in and first-out system were held to indicate the FBI's due
49. 547 F.2d at 612.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 610-11.
52. Id. at 610 n.ll citing FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974, 94TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. 178 (Joint. Comm. Print 1975).
53. Id. at 613. In Meeropol v. Levi, No. 75-1121 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1975), 21 part-time
employees, one-third of the total FOIA processors, were needed. In Fellner v. Levi, No. 75-




diligence. 4 The showing that, despite diligence, the existing re-
sources were inadequate to meet the demand was held to prove
exceptional circumstances.
There could be a different result if the resource allocation were
directly challenged. Since the commitment of all available and ap-
propriate personnel was not challenged,55 the court was able to avoid
discussing the issues that might have been raised had the plaintiff
contended that the agency misappropriated its manpower re-
sources. In the meantime, the court has been able to construe an
exception to the operation of the statute as a double safety valve:
the exceptional circumstances clause operates to take statutory
pressure off the constrained agency, and it presents to the court the
opportunity to reduce demand for judicial action in an ongoing de-
bate on disclosure between the legislative and executive branches.
The majority opinion has now placed the debate back where it
started-in the hands of Congress which controls the funding of
agencies which are to expedite disclosure. Congress can legislate the
result which it desires from strict compliance so that the next round
of cases will present more clearly limited questions regarding the
ultimate congressional goal of disclosure.
There remain the objections to the court's reasoning posed by
Judge Leventhal in the concurring opinion. Although he agreed with
the interpretation that the FBI's resource limitations constituted
exceptional circumstances, he characterized the majority opinion as
effecting a reversal in the burden of proof: "No longer must the
Government make out a case of exceptional circumstances; instead
the plaintiff will be required to show a 'genuine need and reason for
urgency."' 6
This objection can be refuted by referring to the complete word-
ing of the majority statement:
We believe also that Congress wished to reserve the role of
the courts for two occasions, (1) When the agency was not showing
due diligence in processing plaintiff's individual request or was
lax overall in meeting its obligations under the Act with all avail-
able resources, and (2) when plaintiff can show a genuine need
and reason for urgency in gaining access to Government records
ahead of prior applicants for information."
There can be no disagreement about the first quoted instance.
54. 547 F.2d at 616.
55. See id. at 616.
56. Id. at 617 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 615.
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The fact of not meeting the deadlines can establish the plaintiff's
right to action in the courts. There is no burden on the plaintiff to
show the agency is not using due diligence, just as in the instant case
there was no need for Open America to prove lack of due diligence
on the FBI's part. All Open America needed to do was show lack of
compliance. The second instance is clearly intended to exist when
the agency has contended it comes within the exceptional circum-
stances provision. Indeed, that is the only area of the statute where
due diligence is a prerequisite. It is clear from the presentation of
evidence by Open America that the burden is, as Congress intended
and as Judge Leventhal thinks proper, on the agency to prove the
applicability of that exceptional circumstances provision. A show-
ing of urgency by the plaintiff would be necessary only in the event
that the special provision applies in order to render that provision
waivable by the court.
A further objection is made by Judge Leventhal to the value
judgment of the majority regarding the adverse effect of a priority
list established by filing of suit.5" Judge Leventhal points to the
provision awarding attorney's fees and litigation costs to a plaintiff
who prevails59 as a barrier to that discrimination. The majority fears
an invidious discrimination as a result of suit priority. However,
Judge Leventhal seems to overlook or minimize two possibilities:
someone must pay the court costs as the suit progresses and many
cannot afford that advance of cash, and a complainant who can ill
afford the suit may lose and recover nothing.
Judge Leventhal's third objection is to the inquiry by the court
into the agency's resources. "[Aibsent a clear statutory mandate
or extraordinary circumstances a court does not normally inquire
into a defendant's resources . . . .." A clear answer to this objec-
tion seems to be that the case involved both acknowledged excep-
tions: a statutory mandate to the agency to show due diligence (it
is difficult. to imagine how this could be accomplished without
agency evidence regarding its resources and allocations) and the
existence of exceptional circumstances in the difficulty for the
agency to comply. In fact, Judge Leventhal based his concurrence
on his own acceptance of certain facts regarding those resources.
A final observation by Judge Leventhal is as follows;
The legislature contemplates that the judiciary will seek to define
58. Id. at 620 (Leventhal, J., concurring). "Diligence in seeking court relief is not a fool
proof way of assigning priority, but it is material and by no means unprecedented." Id.
59. Id. at 620 n.10.
60. Id. at 620 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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executive compliance according to the legislative mandate. Soft-
ening that mandate by construction serves to provide a gloss
that the agency is properly performing the duties assigned by the
statute, and operates, in effect, to gloss over and screen out any
shortfalls in agency performance from the committees and bodies
of the legislature. They might otherwise be compelled-by ex-
plicit judicial avowal that its decree enforcing the legislative will
cannot be enforced by sanctions-to confront the gulf between
their expressed will and the practical realities of agency compli-
ance."
In contrast, the author offers the observation that the relief afforded
by the exceptional circumstances clause may so dilute the disclo-
sure amendments that Congress, if still in favor of expedition, will
be compelled to enunciate its ultimate policies regarding resource
allocations and/or increase the funding of the agencies for request
screening. For proponents of disclosure, such a result would best
serve the public interest.
LOUISE H. MCMURRAY
The State College Press and the Public Forum
Doctrine
In a recent case the Fifth Circuit decided that a student
editor of a state university campus newspaper could not be com-
pelled to print paid advertisements submitted for publication.
The author of this note disputes the court's analysis in determin-
ing that the campus newspaper was not a public forum. Upon
concluding that a public forum was involved, the author argues
that the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right of access
arising from the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Mississippi Gay Alliance submitted a paid advertisement
and an announcement' to The Reflector, a Mississippi State Univer-
sity campus newspaper.' The advertisement informed the public of
61. Id. at 618 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
1. The Reflector regularly ran a "Briefs" section in which announcements of campus and
local organizations were printed gratuitously. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536
F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1976).
2. There was a dispute as to whether or not The Reflector was the "official" newspaper
of Mississippi State University. Plaintiffs claimed that it was (Complaint for Plaintiff at
paragraph 9), and that the paper itself bore the designation "Official Newspaper of Missis-
sippi State University" on the front page. The answer of the University stated that there was
no "official" university newspaper. Answer for Defendant at paragraph 9. The answer of
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